

25X1 MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]
Acting Director, Office of Program
Assessment, RM Staff

25X1 From: [REDACTED]
Associate Director for Foreign Studies
and Technology, U.S. Army Material
Development and Readiness Command

Subject: CIA Scientific and Technical Intelligence (S&TI) Products

1. I have prepared two memoranda for your consideration. One, for your signature and with requisite comment, forwards the study to [REDACTED]
25X1 The second, for [REDACTED] signature, forwards the study to the DCI.

2. The study was sent to DIA and CIA for comment with a memorandum signed by you (DCI/IC 78-215). I would like to address their replies for your benefit, although I recommend no further exchange with DIA and CIA at this time.

3. CIA Comments. In general, these comments are forthcoming and positive. CIA agrees that the "...study addresses some long-existing problems and offers some useful recommendations." They agree with the objective of improving intelligence sharing in the S&TI field.

4. Action by CIA. After review of the draft report, the NFAC Executive Officer advises that:

- NFAC S&TI production plans will be made available to DIA in order to avoid unneeded duplication.
- When planning its S&TI production program, NFAC will consult the DIA Catalog of Approved Scientific and Technical Intelligence Tasks (CAST).

5. Points of Disagreement with CIA.

- a. CIA does "...not feel that sufficient credit was given in the study to existing coordinating mechanisms such as STIC, JAEIC, and WSSIC."

Study Team Comment: Available evidence indicates that these three committees provide for information exchange, but not production coordination. In view of the CIA position, which is shared by DIA, recommend additional interviews and analysis prior to promulgation of the report.

- b. CIA misunderstood the recommendation of the study report regarding duplication which was carefully worded as follows: "to eliminate that portion of the duplication between CIA and DIA S&TI production that is undesirable." As a result, paragraph 2 of their memo objects to something not proposed in the study report.

Study Team Comment: It was assumed that because CIA and DIA S&TI production programs were not coordinated, even informally, that some wasteful duplication was bound to occur willy-nilly. This assumption was not tested during the study. Should DIA and CIA exchange S&TI production plans in advance as indicated in the CIA memo, there should be less unplanned duplication.

- c. CIA states that it sanitizes documents whenever it can, and that sanitization is a laborious, time-consuming undertaking.

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Study Team Comment: CIA feels many sanitized reports would lack credibility because the "evidential reasoning" would be eliminated. The review of CIA products by the study team and discussion of them with potential users indicates CIA is ill-advised. CIA analysts are apparently

conditioned by frequently being in adversary situations where they differ with DIA or one or more of the Services on a controversial topic. Under such circumstances DIA will properly insist on disseminating the agreed position and will not let subordinate-level commands select between opposing positions. On the other hand, many CIA studies are unique, could be sanitized, and would be accepted by R&D level users if simple agreed cover stories were used to disguise actual, sensitive sources.

6. DIA Comments. DIA's memorandum agrees only that inhibitions exist for use of CIA products in DOD. In DIA's view, apparently, this is desirable. No action or changes for improvement are indicated, in contrast to the CIA approach.

7. Points of Disagreement With DIA.

- a. As is the case with CIA, DIA construes the study report as being aimed at eliminating all analytic and production redundancy. Obviously the report must be reworded to eliminate any ambiguities on this point, since in actuality there is no real disagreement.
- b. The DIA memo confuses production planning and control with committee discussions in the Weapons and Space Systems Intelligence Committee (WSSIC), the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC), and the Scientific and Technical Intelligence Committee (STIC).
- c. The DIA memo seems to say that CIA products should not be disseminated, but that CIA views should be aired at WSSIC, STIC, and JAEIC and then run through a DIA filter before going to DOD users. In point of fact, a number of DOD users, SAC for example, receive all CIA S&TI products

directly from Langley. Throughout DOD, dissemination of CIA products is hit-or-miss and should be systematized.

8. Recommendations.

- a. That you forward a memo along the lines of the one enclosed to the D/DCI/RM.
- b. That the following points be clarified before the study is sent to CIA and DIA with recommendations for corrective action:
 - The effect of WSSIC, STIC, and JAEIC on production scheduling and elimination of unwitting duplication.
 - The degree to which CIA S&TI products could be sanitized. No firm quantitative data now exist.



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DCI/IC-78/---

MEMORANDUM FOR:
Deputy to the DCI for Resource Management

From:
Acting Director for Program Assessment Office

Subject: CIA Scientific and Technical Intelligence (S&TI) Products

Reference: The Utility and Accessibility of CIA S&TI Products in
Support of DoD Materiel Acquisition dated August 1978

1. Attached is a memorandum for your signature to the DCI, forwarding a study of CIA S&TI products.
2. The study has been reviewed by CIA and DIA and already has had two positive results:
 - NFAC will make its S&TI production plans available in advance to DIA in order for DIA to avoid any duplication not deemed desirable.
 - NFAC also plans to refer to DIA's production program so that CIA can eliminate some duplication not considered necessary.
3. Both CIA and DIA had reservations to certain of the study recommendations. These reservations appear to be based on misunderstandings that need clarification. These points will be subject of further study and analysis before recommending further action.
4. Recommend (a) you read only the executive summary of the attached report (b) sign the memorandum for the DCI.

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DCI/IC-78/

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

From:

Deputy to the DCI for Resource Management

Subject: CIA Scientific and Technical Intelligence Products

Reference: The Utility and Accessibility of CIA S&TI Products in
Support of DoD Materiel Acquisition dated August 1978

1. The draft report attached addresses some long-existing problems. It has been circulated to DIA and CIA for comment and has produced beneficial results in that there will be an exchange between CIA and DIA of planned programs of S&T intelligence production. This will help eliminate inadvertent duplication. Duplication considered desirable by either agency will continue.
2. Both CIA and DIA had reservations to certain of the study recommendations. Both feel that some duplication is desirable and misconstrued the recommendations as calling for elimination of all duplication. The wording of the report will be reviewed to remove ambiguities. DIA takes the view that CIA S&TI products should not be disseminated more widely within DoD. Additional data gathering and analysis is needed before making a firm recommendation to you on this point at this time. CIA feels it is doing all that is reasonable to sanitize its products. This point too requires further study before making a final recommendation. Both DIA and CIA believe that certain of the NFIB subcommittees (JAEIC, WSSIC, STIC) eliminate undesirable duplication of S&TI production. Our preliminary data show otherwise, but this area will be closely studied before the draft study is made final.
3. Recommend you read the executive summary (blue pages) of the attached draft report at this time. Following clarification of the points in question, I will make firm recommendations to you in this matter.

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